ABSTRACT Active containment systems are a major tool for reducing the uncertainty associated with the introduction of monocultures, genetically engineered or not, into target habitats for a large number of biotechnological applications (e.g., bioremediation, bioleaching, biopesticides, biofuels, biotransformations, live vaccines, etc.). While biological containment reduces the survival of the introduced organism outside the target habitat and/or upon completion of the projected task, gene containment strategies reduce the lateral spread of the key genetic determinants to indigenous microorganisms. In fundamental research, suicide circuits become relevant tools to address the role of gene transfer, mainly plasmid transfer, in evolution and how this transfer contributes to genome plasticity and to the rapid adaptation of microbial communities to environmental changes. Many lethal functions and regulatory circuits have been used and combined to design efficient containment systems. As many new genomes are being sequenced, novel lethal genes and regulatory elements are available, e.g., new toxin-antitoxin modules, and they could be used to increase further the current containment efficiencies and to expand containment to other organisms. Although the current containment systems can increase the predictability of genetically modified organisms in the environment, containment will never be absolute, due to the existence of mutations that lead to the appearance of surviving subpopulations. In this sense, orthogonal systems (xenobiology) appear to be the solution for setting a functional genetic firewall that will allow absolute containment of recombinant organisms.
Biotechnology provides a large number of environmental applications (e.g., bioremediation, biofilters, bioleaching, biopesticides, biofuels, biotransformations [green chemistry], live vaccines, etc.) that support the development of the bioeconomy (1) (2) (3) . Nevertheless, the biotechnological processes planned to work in the open field are not easy to implement since they have to cope with a wide range of chemical, physical, and biological variations that could lead to a low level of predictability, making such processes difficult to control (4) . In addition, the biotechnological processes that introduce large quantities of microorganisms into the ecosystem have raised concerns about their potential impact on the environment. Such concerns have prompted the creation of risk assessment research programs oriented to developing new strategies in order to increase the safety and predictability of the microorganisms released into the environment and especially those that have been genetically modified (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) .
To better control the behavior of a genetically modified organism (GMO) introduced in a target habitat, two different and complementary containment approaches have to be considered: (i) the survival of the GMO has to be limited by engineering a controlled life cycle to reduce its dissemination (biological containment), and (ii) the ability of the GMO to spread the new genetic information to potential recipients has to be eliminated (gene containment) ( Fig. 1) .
Plasmids harboring biological containment circuits to control the life cycle of the GMO and contained plasmids endowed with a gene containment system that reduces their horizontal transfer frequencies have been successfully engineered. Biological and gene containment strategies are of great interest not only for their biotechnological applications but also for being useful tools for fundamental research. In this chapter we will review and discuss different aspects of the containment systems, including their fundamentals, major shortcomings and the challenges to reaching absolute reliability ("certainty of containment"), and their different applications in biology.
FUNDAMENTALS OF CONTAINMENT AND GENETIC SAFEGUARD CIRCUITS
There are two main strategies to diminish the potential risks associated with the deliberate or unintentional release of GMOs into the environment. These two strategies have been called passive and active containment systems.
Passive Containment
Passive containment consists of creating disabled strains through the induction of debilitating mutations. One method widely used for passive containment is to engineer auxotrophic organisms unable to synthesize an essential compound required for their survival. These auxotrophic organisms die or cannot divide when they escape the bioreactor where the essential compound is provided (11) . Most passive containment systems have the drawback that they are bacteriostatic rather than bactericidal. Nevertheless, two auxotrophies have been described that have a high potential for human applications since they are bactericidal (12) , i.e., alanine FIGURE 1 Concept of biological and gene containment. (A) In biological containment the GMO is restricted to the target habitat for a limited period of time. To accomplish this, the organism is engineered with a suicide circuit encoding a toxin (TOX) that usually is located in a plasmid and switched off (SURVIVAL), but it becomes activated in response to a specific environmental signal leading to cell death (DEATH). (B) In gene containment, it is the recombinant DNA rather than the organism itself that is the subject of containment. To create a barrier that restricts dispersal of such novel DNA from the GMO to the indigenous microbiota, a genetic circuit based on a toxic function (TOX) closely linked to the recombinant DNA needs to be engineered in such a way that the lethal function is inactive in the host GMO (e.g., formation of an antitoxin [ANT]-toxin [TOX] complex) but becomes activated (TOX) in the potential recipients of the contained DNA that lack the antitoxin function, leading to the death of such cells. doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.PLAS-0011-2013.f1 racemase mutants that have a requirement for D-Ala (13) and thymidilate synthase mutants that have a requirement for thymidine or thymine (14) .
However, the disabled organisms engineered for passive containment may not compete successfully with the wild-type microbiota, and therefore they cannot be ideal candidates for some environmental applications (15) . Moreover, engineered auxotrophy can remain effective as long as gene transfer does not compensate for the mutation and/or the nutrient required for survival is not available outside the target area.
Active Containment
An alternative to passive containment is to use competitive wild-type organisms and to equip them with controllable lethal functions that will not interfere with their life cycle unless some environmental signals of interest are present (5, 6, 15) . The two basic elements of an active containment system are (i) lethal functions and (ii) control elements ( Fig. 2) .
Although the lethal functions usually have a broad host range, cell death efficiency depends upon the host cell and its metabolism. Usually, the lethal effect is higher during the exponential phase and declines progressively during the stationary phase (16) . The level of resistance to the toxic protein depends on the strain under study; e.g., whereas Pseudomonas putida is sensitive to the toxic effect of the Gef protein, Pseudomonas aeruginosa seems to be particularly resistant to such lethal function (17) .
On the other hand, when GMOs are destined to carry out a function in the open environment, the best strategy for containment is to engineer a control element that takes this into account. The introduced organisms should persist in the environment as long as they are needed, and cell death should be induced upon The control element can be engineered as a double transcriptional regulatory circuit. The sensor protein recognizes an environmental signal and interacts with the cognate regulated promoter (Preg1), which in turn drives transcription of a regulator that controls the expression of a second regulated promoter (Preg2) running transcription of the lethal gene. (C) The control element may involve posttranslational regulation through an immunity protein that specifically neutralizes the killing effect of the constitutively expressed lethal function. To this end, the expression of the immunity gene is driven by the Preg promoter under control of the sensor protein that responds to the environmental signal. doi:10.1128/microbiolspec .PLAS-0011-2013.f2 completion of the application. It becomes necessary, therefore, to analyze the task of the organism to identify the changes that take place when this task is completed and, then, to design a control element that responds to the most appropriate environmental changes (5, 15) .
The lethal functions
The properties that a lethal function should have to be used in the design of active containment systems are (i) high efficiency of killing, (ii) broad host range targeting central cellular functions, (iii) low mutation rate, and (iv) no interference with the biotechnological application. The lethal functions used in active containment systems can be classified according to the cellular compartment that they target.
Cell envelope
Toxin-antitoxin loci, which are ubiquitous in Archaea and Bacteria, play important roles in several cellular processes and can be used for developing containment systems. The toxin-antitoxin module consists of labile antitoxin and a stable toxin (18) . The lethal functions most extensively used for developing active containment circuits are those that disrupt the membrane potential, especially the type I two-component toxin-antitoxin systems involved in postsegregational killing of plasmidfree cells (hok genes from plasmids R1 and F) and their chromosomal counterparts (relF [hokD] and gef [hokC] genes from Escherichia coli) (15, 19) (Table 1) . The cytoplasmic membrane is also the cellular target of other lethal functions such as holins, e.g., the S and Ejh holins (16, 20) (Table 1) . Holins are small proteins produced by bacteriophages that permeabilize the cytoplasmic membrane at a programmed time leading to cell death and to the release of a lytic protein (endolysin) that degrades the bacterial peptidoglycan, provoking lysis of the host cell and the release of the phage progeny (21) . Endolysins such as protein E and protein L from the phages ΦX174 and MS2, respectively (21) , have been used as lethal functions (22, 23) (Table 1 ). Chimeric E-L lytic genes showed a strong killing effect (22) . The amidase from T7 phage, as well as phage lytic cassettes containing both holin and endolytic genes, e.g., S/R/Rz cassette from λ phage, are additional lethal elements that target the cell envelope (21) used in active containment systems (16, 23, 24) (Table 1 ). The PezT/ξ toxins of the epsilon/zeta antitoxin-toxin systems from Firmicutes are an example of lethal functions that cause programmed cell death by inhibiting peptidoglycan biosynthesis (25, 26) , and therefore they could also be used to engineer active containment systems.
Periplasm
A lethal function that targets the periplasmic space of Gram-negative and some Gram-positive bacteria (corynebacteria and mycobacteria) is the levansucrase 
Cytoplasm
The relBE genes from E. coli encode a type II toxinantitoxin couple that affects protein synthesis (18, 19) . While expression of the relE gene is highly toxic to Saccharomyces cerevisiae, this toxicity can be partially counteracted by expressing the relB gene. Therefore, the relE-relB genes, as well as similar toxin-antitoxin pairs, can be used to design active containment systems in genetically modified yeasts (28) . The ccdB gene, which is the toxin of another type II toxin-antitoxin module, encodes a protein that inhibits the DNA gyrase complex, and it has also been used to construct circuits for programmed death in response to changes in the environment (29) ( Table 1) . Overexpression of the relA gene product (ribosomeassociated ppGpp synthetase I) produces growth arrest of E. coli cultures, and the participation of the relA gene has been proposed in a concept for a biological containment system (23) ( Table 1) .
A highly efficient biological containment system is based on the tightly regulated derepression of the streptavidin gene (stv) from Streptomyces avidinii ( Table 1) . Streptavidin binds to D-biotin (vitamin H) and depletes this essential prosthetic group involved in one-carbon unit metabolism, causing cell death (30) .
Nucleases have two main advantages over other lethal functions used in active containment systems: (i) their cellular target (DNA and/or RNA) is universal, and (ii) the genetic material itself is degraded, which eliminates the main source of concern. A modified nucA gene encoding the mature form of the extracellular nuclease from Serratia marcescens, which endonucleolytically cleaves RNA and DNA, has been used to construct several effective conditional suicide systems for bacteria and yeasts (31-33) ( Table 1 ). The three-gene restriction cassette LlaIR + from Lactococcus lactis (34), as well as the ecoRIR lethal gene encoding the type II EcoRI restriction endonuclease (35) , and the I-CeuI homing endonuclease from the green alga Chlamydomonas moewusii that breaks chromosomal 23S rDNA (36) , were also used to engineer containment systems ( Table 1) .
RNases of bacterial origin have been used as lethal functions in both eukaryotes and prokaryotes. Barnase from Bacillus amyloliquefaciens was used for the inhibition of fungal diseases and for induction of male sterility in plants (37) . Colicin E3 is a 58-kDa protein encoded by plasmid pColE3-CA38 that specifically cleaves the 16S rRNA of E. coli at a position 49 nucleotides from its 3′ end, in a region that is conserved among the 16S and 16S-like rRNAs in all three primary kingdoms (38) . Colicin E3-mediated cleavage prevents protein synthesis and causes cell death. The colE3 gene has been engineered to develop efficient gene and biological containment systems (38, 39) (Table 1 ).
The control element
When GMOs are used under controlled conditions (e.g., in the laboratory or in a fermentation plant) it is possible to couple the expression of the lethal gene to well-known regulatory circuits. Tight control of the lethal gene is crucial to design an efficient containment system, and this control can be performed at different levels.
Chemical control
The first conditional suicide system was engineered to contain microorganisms that are killed if they accidentally escape the bioreactor (40) . To accomplish this, the hok gene was cloned under the control of the E. coli tryptophan promoter (Ptrp) in a pBR322 derivative such that the presence of tryptophan repressed hok expression and allowed the survival of recombinant E. coli cells in industrial fermentations. A deliberate or unintentional release of the recombinant bacteria to the environment, where the concentration of tryptophan is negligible, will cause derepression of the hok gene, leading to cell death (40) ( Table 2 ). An analogous containment system was developed with the promoter of the E. coli alkaline phosphatase gene (PphoA), which is active under phosphate limitation, fused to the complete parB locus (hok/sok) of plasmid R1. The parB locus in combination with PphoA ensures both plasmid stabilization by postsegregational killing of plasmid free cells during fermentation and killing of the cells if they are released from the bioreactor to a phosphate-free or limited environment (phosphate is frequently a growthlimiting factor in nature) (41) ( Table 2 ). The combination of E. coli K-12 relA mutants, which die very fast under nutrient-poor environmental conditions because they lack the stringent response (passive containment), with a plasmid-encoded suicide system based on the T7 endolysin-encoding gene expressed from the PphoA promoter resulted in effective containment of GMOs outside the laboratory (24) . Biological containment systems have also been engineered on plasmids using the Plac promoter and the LacI repressor from E. coli, and they are triggered by addition of isopropyl-β-Dthiogalactopyranoside (Table 2 ). These suicide plasmids restricted survival of the E. coli host cells in different growth media as well as in soil (42, 43) . Whereas the Plac promoter is effective in E. coli, to develop containment systems in nonenteric bacteria of environmental relevance (e.g., pseudomonads) it was necessary to replace Plac with some broad host range derivatives that retain the LacI-mediated repression (e.g., Ptac and Ptrc promoters [16, 30] ) or the strong P A1/04/03 synthetic promoter (39, 44, 45) (Table 2) .
The PsacB promoter/SacR regulator and the sacB lethal gene have also been used to induce suicide of E. coli cells in a sucrose-containing medium. This containment system was tested under in vitro conditions and in soil microcosms (27) ( Table 2 ). The Pm promoter from P. putida, which is activated through the XylS regulator in the presence of benzoate or benzoate analogues, was used in combination with the lethal ejh gene or the gene E for developing suicide plasmids that upon induction caused death in a broad range of Gramnegative bacteria (16, 20) (Table 2 ). The AraC/P BAD regulatory system that responds to arabinose ( Table 2) has been used for the control of the lethal nucA gene to engineer a suicide cassette activated by the presence of arabinose in recombinant E. coli cells (33), as well as to engineer passive containment circuits (16) . A hybrid ADH2/GAPDH promoter that is repressed by glucose ( Table 2 ) in S. cerevisiae has been fused to nucA to engineer a conditional suicide system that kills the yeast cells and destroys the genetic material whenever the host cells escape into the environment where glucose is scarce (32) .
The strict iron-regulated promoter PviuB from Vibrio cholerae was fused to lysis gene E from phage ΦX174 to establish an in vivo inducible lysis circuit ( Table 2 ). An isopropyl-β-D-thiogalactopyranoside-inducible PT7controlled antigen expression circuit was integrated into the lysis system to build a novel E. coli-based antigen delivery system. The strain lyses in response to an ironlimiting signal in vivo, implementing antigen release and biological containment (46) . Different conditional suicide systems that respond to the absence of certain aromatic compounds in the environment, most of which are formed during the degradation of toxic pollutants, have been developed to engineer contained biodegraders ( Table 2) , and they will be discussed in the section "Biotechnological Applications of Containment Circuits." 
Environmental stress control
Although most of the containment systems are triggered by a chemical signal that controls the expression of the lethal function, physical control based on temperature has also been reported ( Table 2 ). Most of the regulatory circuits that respond to temperature changes are based on the P L and P R promoters from the lytic module of the λ phage and the cognate thermosensitive CI857 mutant repressor that becomes inactivated at temperatures higher than 30°C. Suicide plasmids with different resistance markers, origins of replication, and P L ::gene E or P R ::gene E fusions have been constructed (22) . Although bacterial lysis due to expression of gene E is usually induced by a temperature shift of the growing culture from 28 to 42°C, the construction of a mutated P R promoter/operator region resulted in a new expression system that stably repressed gene E expression at temperatures up to 37°C but still allowed induction of cell lysis at a temperature range of 39 to 42°C (22) . By also using the heat-sensitive CI857 repressor, an efficient bacterial suicide system based on an I-CeuI homing endonuclease from the green alga C. moewusii was developed. Thermo-induction of the expression of I-CeuI endonuclease caused irreparable chromosomal DNA damage and cell death in recombinant E. coli cells (36) . L-rhamnose induction of I-CeuI was also engineered as an alternative suicide system that could be useful for manufacturing heat-sensitive products (36) ( Table 2) . On the other hand, cold-sensitive suicide plasmids have also been developed to contain bacteria that escape into the environment from bioreactors during fermentation processes or from humans and animals treated with bacterial live vaccines. To construct such coldsensitive lethal circuits, the λ cI857/P R expression system was combined with either the lacI/Plac or the phage 434 cI/P R regulatory elements that control the expression of the lysis gene E. E. coli cells harboring these suicide plasmids are able to grow at 37°C, but cell lysis takes place at temperatures below 30°C (22) .
Environmental stresses other than temperature, e.g., starvation conditions, pH gradients, etc., are also signaling factors that can be used to develop conditional suicide systems for active containment of microorganisms in the open field. In this sense, the P1 promoter of the E. coli ribosomal rrnB operon (rrnB P1) is an efficient biosensor for poor growth conditions expected to occur after the accidental release of GMOs from a bioreactor to the open environment, where the microorganisms usually face starvation conditions. A concept for a conditional suicide system employing the rrnB P1 promoter, the relA gene, and phage-derived cell wall lytic genes has been proposed (23) ( Table 2) .
Stochastic control
For some purposes it might be useful to develop control systems for containment dependent on time (stochastic induction) rather than on the composition of the environment. If killing is induced just as a function of time, many unpredictable factors that can influence killing induction in real-life scenarios can be overcome. Such a stochastic induction system has been based on DNA recombination events (switches) that randomly result in activation of the suicide function (15) . The invertible switch promoter PfimA directing the synthesis of type 1 fimbriae of E. coli has been used as a model system for the stochastic induction of suicide ( Table 2 ). The orientation of the phase switch is controlled in trans by the products of two genes, fimB and fimE, located upstream of the PfimA::gef fusion. When the resulting system was expressed in a plasmid, it was observed as a reduction of the bacterial population with increasing significance as the cell growth rate decreased. When an E. coli culture harboring the suicide plasmid was left as stationary cells in suspension without nutrients, viability dropped exponentially over a period of several days. Moreover, in competition with noncontained cells, the contained cells are always outcompeted during growth (47) . Although this system is only valid for E. coli, similar strategies can be applied to other organisms by using species-specific stochastic expression circuits or recombination systems that are functional in a broad spectrum of bacteria. To this end, a recombinational system based on the broad host range RP4 resolvase and two res sites embracing a transcription terminator placed between a strong promoter and a lethal gene was designed for suicide purposes (15) .
Biological interaction-dependent control
For microorganisms interacting with plants (biocontrol strains, plant growth-promoting inoculants, rhizoremediation biocatalysts, etc.) it would be interesting to develop containment systems that respond to plant-derived signals, thus avoiding dispersion of such microorganisms outside the plant environment. In this sense, the putA and putP promoters of the proline catabolic pathway from P. putida are induced upon exposure of cells to proline or root exudates (48) . By combining the P A1/04/03 ::gene E fusion with the Pput A ::lacI regulatory element, a containment system was developed that restricts dispersal of bacteria to the presence of proline from the rhizosphere of plants of agronomic importance (49) (Table 2) . Thus, the rhizobacterium P. putida strain CS-4 endowed with the active biological containment system colonized the rhizosphere at a level similar to that of the wild-type strain. However, when the plants were removed, the CS-4 population decreased in bulk soil at a higher rate than the wild-type strain (49) .
Sometimes the signal that triggers the suicide system is a biological agent. This is the case of a regulatory circuit based on a phage-inducible promoter isolated from the lytic phage Φ31 from L. lactis (Table 2 ). This promoter is used to activate the expression of a lethal function after phage infection, thus protecting the L. lactis bacterial population as a whole against the infecting bacteriophage (34) .
Cell density-dependent control
A population control circuit that autonomously regulates the density of an E. coli population has been engineered by coupling gene expression driven by cellcell communication to cell survival and death. The cell density is broadcasted and detected by elements from a bacterial quorum-sensing system (LuxRI) ( Table 2) , which in turn regulate the death rate caused by the ccdB lethal gene (Table 1 ). This type of regulatory circuit makes it possible to program the dynamics of a population despite variability in the behavior of individual cells (29) .
Gene transfer control
Plasmids are frequently transferred among microbes, and cell-free DNA released after the death of engineered organisms can remain functional and transferable even after long periods of time. Thus, gene containment systems have to be developed to prevent uptake and inheritance of engineered DNA (10) . Although usually the expression of the lethal gene is controlled at the transcriptional level, posttranslational control of the lethal function has also been engineered in gene containment circuits (Fig. 2) . In this sense, the immunity E3 protein is a plasmid-encoded acidic 9.3-kDa protein that binds stoichiometrically to the C-terminal RNase domain of colicin E3, preventing its RNase activity. The colE3 and immE3 genes have been engineered to develop a gene containment system in which gene (plasmid) transfer is the signal that activates the lethal function (38) ( Table 2) . A posttranslational control in which the cognate inhibitor acts at the target site of the lethal function has been developed with the EcoRI methytransferase, a monomeric S-adenosyl-L-methionine-dependent enzyme that delivers a methyl group to the internal adenine of the EcoRI recognition site and thus protects DNA of cleavage by the EcoRI restriction endonuclease. As indicated above for the colE3/immE3 genes, the ecoRIR/ ecoRIM genes have been used as a toxin-antitoxin genetic circuit that significantly reduces lateral gene spread (35) (Table 2 ).
STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE CONTAINMENT
A general feature of all of the containment systems described so far is that a surviving subpopulation of cells, in the range of 10 −7 to 10 −3 per cell per generation depending on the particular system under study, ceases to respond to the toxic effect of the lethal function. Although a rate of escape of killing of 10 −7 is not too high, the number of survivors escaping suicide can be significant in environmental applications that use large quantities of cells (15, 30) . The recommended limit of survival or engineered DNA transmission is less than 1 cell per 10 8 cells (50) or less than 1,000 cells per 2 liters, according to the National Institutes of Health.
The analysis of the survivors revealed that mutations are the main drawback in containment. Mutations that inactivate the containment system have been located either in the lethal function (39, 51) or in the control element (42, 44) . A detailed molecular analysis revealed that spontaneous transposition of insertion elements within the lethal gene encoding the EcoRI endonuclease was the most frequent cause of survival to the acquisition of a contained plasmid in E. coli cells (35) . In contrast, deletions involving the lethal gene seem to be the most frequent cause of acquisition of a contained plasmid in other Gram-negative bacteria such as P. putida, Agrobacterium tumefaciens, and Ralstonia eutropha (35) .
A way to reduce the problem of mutations and increase the efficiency of containment is to engineer genetic circuits with more than one lethal function. When the gef gene was used in a system responding to the absence of benzoate effectors, the rate of escape from killing decreased from 10 −6 (one copy of gef ) to 10 −8 (two copies of gef ) (51) . Duplication of the relF gene also increased plasmid containment by about three orders of magnitude (43) . The two copies of the relF gene were arranged in the contained plasmid in such a way that no single mutational event (deletion in particular) can lead to inactivation of both lethal genes. Protection against plasmid transfer was observed in test tubes and in rat intestine. Moreover, in soil and seawater a more than 7 orders of magnitude reduction in suicide bacteria (biological containment) was achieved (44) . Duplication of the nucA gene encoding the S. marcescens nuclease in a conditional suicide plasmid was also reported to improve the reliability of containment (33) . Nevertheless, the reduction in the number of survivors by duplicating a lethal function is always smaller than that expected by theoretical calculations, which predict that the efficiency of a dual containment system should be the product of the containment efficiencies due to each individual lethal function (44) . This reduction in the efficiency of containment can be due to several factors such as (i) homologous recombination and gene conversion between the two copies of the suicide function, (ii) the existence of mutations that inactivate the regulatory element controlling the expression of both lethal genes, and (iii) the existence of mutations in the cellular target of the lethal function. To circumvent these limitations, the use of nonidentical suicide functions with different cellular target sites whose expression is under the control of different regulatory circuits may be a suitable strategy (44) . In this sense, the colE3 gene, encoding an RNase, and the ecoRIR gene, encoding a DNase, have been placed under different transcriptional signals and combined in the same plasmid. This dual containment circuit significantly reduced the spread of a gene cloned between the two lethal genes, and the system achieved the anticipated level of containment (52) .
Biological containment systems may induce slow death of bacterial cells in soil versus the fast killing rate in laboratory assays, as observed with the xylS/Pm::lacI/ P A1/04/03 ::gef system (see above) in P. putida (45) . A way to improve the performance of the containment system is by linking the expression of a gene that gives rise to essential metabolites (e.g., the asd gene product for biosynthesis of diaminopimelic acid, methionine, lysine, and threonine) to that of the repressor that prevents the expression of the lethal gene. This would guarantee at the same time both the synthesis of essential metabolites and the repression of the killing element (53) . Upon triggering by the appropriate environmental signal, expression of the lethal gene and debilitation of the strain should lead to a faster disappearance rate. A P. putida Δasd strain harboring a Pm::asd fusion and the suicide system (xylS/Pm::lacI/P A1/04/03 ::gef ) in the chromosome survived and colonized rhizosphere soil containing the effector 3-methylbenzoate at a level similar to that of the wild-type strain. However, whereas the asd +contained strain was still detectable in soils without 3methylbenzoate after 100 days, the contained Δasd mutant disappeared in less than 25 days, and the rate of mutations leading to escape from the lethal effect of the gef gene product was reduced by at least one order of magnitude (<10 −9 mutants per cell per generation) (53) .
These results indicate that an active containment system can be reinforced by using a host strain with a genetically engineered background that, under the desired conditions, debilitates the cell and increases its rate of suicide (53) .
An important issue in the containment of GMOs is the maintenance of the viability of the contained cells when the specific environmental signal reaches a level that cannot be detected by the regulatory element that controls the lethal gene. For instance, in the case of GMOs destined to remove toxic compounds, the target pollutant may not be bioavailable or may be present at a concentration that cannot activate the regulatory circuit that controls the lethal function. The combination of the containment system with a transport protein that increases the uptake of the pollutant could decrease the threshold to which suicide is induced and therefore increase the survival of the contained cells in slightly polluted environments or in environments where the pollutant has been partially removed by the GMO (J. L. García, and E. Díaz, unpublished data).
THE NEW GENERATION OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS: XENOBIOLOGY
A major conclusion of the large amount of work done in the past decades on systems for containing GMOs is that barriers based on conditional suicide circuits are under Darwinian evolution, and therefore they are sooner or later defeated. The probability of escape from containment and unintended interaction with the environment is now far from what has been called "certainty of containment" or absolute reliability (54) . Scientists have been recently developing creative new strategies to address this problem, and the shortcomings of the current genetic safeguards were presented above (3) . Thus, the construction of minimal genomes that contain only the genes that are necessary to sustain life may make many random mutations lethal, and therefore the likelihood of unpredictable behavior after the microbe is released into the environment would be reduced (55) . A different strategy is based on developing orthogonal life forms that use artificial genetic languages that, by definition, cannot communicate with the extant biochemistry of the existing live world, what could be called a "genetic firewall" (3). The orthogonal life form approach uses biochemical building blocks, e.g., nucleic acids and amino acids, that are incompatible with the natural biological systems and, thus, bring genetic interactions to practically zero. Xenonucleic acids (XNAs) are DNAlike molecules in which the nucleotide bases, double helix geometries, or nucleic acid backbones are nonnatural and cannot be read or replicated by natural polymerases, and therefore they are useless to DNAbased organisms. This scenario is optimal to maintain the distance between the engineered and the existing biological world. Some examples of XNAs that can be replicated in cell-free systems, e.g., PCR, or used to express functional proteins, e.g., green fluorescent protein, have been reported (56, 57) . Recently, living bacteria that look and behave like normal have been evolved to use the synthetic 5-chlorouracil instead of the natural base thymine as a component of their DNA. Since these cells are auxotrophic for a nonnatural chemical and contain a form of DNA that cannot be deciphered by other organisms, they are endowed with two concomitant firewalls for any interaction with other bacteria (58) .
Orthogonal life can be also engineered at the protein level. Thus, synthetic mRNA codons (new genetic alphabet [e.g., quadruplet codons], 6-letter genetic code) (59), artificial tRNA/aminoacyl tRNA synthetase pairs, and the evolution of new ribosomes able to decode new genetic codes (60) can be used to design synthetic organisms made of unnatural polymers that do not interfere with the existing biological world.
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS OF CONTAINMENT CIRCUITS Containment Strategies for Bioremediation
The most advanced containment systems are those developed for bacteria that degrade pollutants. To develop a suitable containment system for biodegraders, the expression of the lethal gene should be coupled with the regulatory system of a pathway for biodegradation of the pollutant in such a way that cells survive in the presence of the pollutant but die after completion of the degradation of the toxic compound or after dispersing to locations outside the polluted area. Since the first biological containment system for bacteria that degrade pollutants was reported (61), different improvements have been carried out, from decreasing the rate of escape to the toxic effect of the lethal function. The control element of the system is a double regulatory circuit (Fig. 2, Table 2 ) based on the xylS regulatory gene and its cognate Pm promoter from the meta-cleavage pathway for degradation of toluene and xylenes of the P. putida pWW0 (TOL) plasmid. Gene E or gef was used as a lethal gene under the control of the LacI-controlled P A1/04/03 promoter (62). The system predicts survival of the biologically contained strain in the presence of XylS effectors, e.g., a wide variety of alkyl-and halosubstituted benzoates (intermediates formed during the biodegradation of toluene, xylenes, and their haloderivatives), because expression of the Pm::lacI fusion gives rise to the production of the LacI repressor, which in turn prevents the expression of the lethal gene. Once the pollutant is exhausted or the bacteria move to locations outside the polluted area, the LacI repressor is no longer produced, leading to the expression of the lethal gene and subsequent cell death (62) (Fig. 3) . FIGURE 3 Rationale of a model biological containment system for biodegraders. The control element consists of a double regulatory circuit based on (i) the XylS sensor protein that recognizes benzoate or benzoate analogues (alkyl-and halo-benzoates) and stimulates gene expression from the Pm promoter and (ii) the lacI gene, whose expression is driven by the Pm promoter, coding for the LacI repressor protein that inhibits the P A1/04/03 promoter (P*). The expression of the lethal gene is under control of the P A1/04/03 (P*) promoter. In the presence of benzoate or benzoate analogues (+ Benzoate) the control element is switched on and the lethal function is not produced (SURVIVAL). Once bacteria complete the degradation of the aromatic compound or spread to a nonpolluted site (− Benzoate), the control system is switched off and, as a consequence, the lethal function is produced (DEATH). XylS a , active conformation of XylS protein. XylS i , inactive conformation of XylS protein. doi:10.1128/microbiolspec.PLAS -0011-2013.f3
Although the system was initially associated with plasmids, the lower rate of killing escape was obtained by integrating the suicide circuit into the chromosome of P. putida cells. This rate of escape (in the range of 10 −8 per cell per generation) was considered satisfactory, and field-release assays were carried out with both the contained and the control uncontained strains. While the biologically contained bacteria were able to colonize the rhizosphere of plants in soil with 3-methylbenzoate but not in nonpolluted soils, the parental P. putida strain colonized the rhizosphere of plants grown in both polluted and nonpolluted soils. Moreover, no evidence of dispersal of the test strains outside the experimental plots was observed (45) .
The XylS/Pm::lacI regulatory loop has also been combined with the Ptac::T7 RNA polymerase gene and the Φ10P (T7 RNA polymerase-dependent promoter of gene 10 of T7 phage)::stv (streptavidin encoding lethal gene) fusions to engineer a triple regulatory circuit that tightly regulates efficient biological containment for bacteria that degrade aromatic compounds (30) ( Table 2 ). An additional level of regulation to decrease uninduced expression of the lethal stv gene was achieved by generating an antisense RNA complementary to the stv transcript (30) .
Although the biological containment systems increase the predictability of GMOs, one of the main concerns about the release of such GMOs to the environment is how recombinant DNA (often located in plasmids) can spread among indigenous bacterial populations. In particular, the transfer of genes to pathogenic bacteria that could increase their virulence and the impact of such transfer on natural populations of organisms are topics of major concern. Moreover, horizontal DNA transfer from transgenic organisms may also be undesirable for process protection and process optimization reasons (5, 15, 39, 63) . Therefore, there is a need to reduce gene spread to ecologically insignificant levels. A first development toward this goal was the construction of mini-transposon cloning vectors derived from Tn5 and Tn10 transposons for the stable integration of heterologous DNA segments into the chromosome of Gram-negative bacteria. Genes introduced into the chromosome on mini-transposons exhibited transfer frequencies (<10 −9 per cell per generation) several orders of magnitude lower than those on plasmid vectors (64) . To reduce further gene spread, gene containment systems have been engineered (15) .
The first systems were based on the transcriptional control of the lethal gene by the Ptrp or the P A1/04/03 promoters (40, 44 ). An alternative system was based on a posttranslational inhibition of a lethal function by a cognate immunity function (38) . Since the containment systems should be effective in the open field, the lethal function should be active in a wide range of potential recipients, but the immunity function should exist naturally in a very restricted number of organisms. In the GMO the lethal gene is closely linked to the novel trait that needs to be contained and constitutively expressed from a promoter that is functional in a broad spectrum of bacteria. In contrast, the immunity gene is located at a distant location in the GMO, such that cotransfer of the lethal and immunity functions will be an extremely low-frequency event. The transfer of the novel trait to a nonimmune organism will be accompanied by transfer of the closely linked lethal gene that, in the absence of immunity, leads to the rapid killing of the recipient cells and prevents the spread of the novel trait ( Fig. 4) . A plasmid containment system based on a toxin-antitoxin couple was engineered with the colicin E3/immunity E3 proteins (38) . Whereas the immE3 gene was stably inserted into the chromosome of different E. coli and P. putida strains, the colE3 gene was cloned in a promiscuous plasmid under the control of the Ptac promoter. The effectiveness of containment was tested using different DNA transfer mechanisms (transformation and conjugation) and a variety of recipient microorganisms of environmental importance. The colE3-based gene containment system decreased the transfer frequencies of the contained plasmid with respect to those of a control plasmid by 4 to 5 orders of magnitude in all recipients checked (38) . A similar containment strategy was developed using the EcoRI endonuclease/EcoRI methylase functions, and this system was shown to be effective also in a broad range of microorganisms (35) .
The colE3-based genetic circuit has been used to develop P. putida strains able to degrade pollutants, whose relevant genotype is subject to a powerful containment system (65) . Thus, the colE3 gene was closely linked to the bph genes for the catabolism of biphenyl and toxic polychlorinated biphenyls, and the resulting bph-colE3 cassette was stably inserted into the chromosome of an immune P. putida strain in a location far from that of the immE3 gene. The resulting strain was able to grow on biphenyl as the sole carbon and energy source, and it did not show any growth disadvantage with respect to the uncontained strain. Moreover, transfer of the bph genes was below detection levels using optimal laboratory conditions for transfer (65) . The colE3-based containment circuit was also combined with the sty genes responsible for styrene degradation in Pseudomonas sp. Y2, and the colE3-sty cassette was engineered in an immune P. putida strain to develop a contained biocatalyst for styrene removal (66) .
Containment Strategies for Vaccines
Although active containment systems are usually designed to prevent the potential risks associated with the accidental or intentional release of GMOs to the open environment, they also have attractive elements for developing vaccines (Table 3) . Suicide plasmids harboring tightly regulated holin-like genes, e.g., gene E or chimeric E-L lysis genes, have been used to induce formation of empty cells with intact envelopes (bacterial ghosts) that are of interest as nonliving candidate vaccines. The bacterial ghosts share all functional and antigenic determinants of the envelope with their living counterparts and thus are able to induce strong local immunity (22) . In the recombinant ghost system, foreign proteins can be targeted to the inner membrane, to the periplasmic space, or to S-layer proteins prior to Emediated lysis. As ghosts have inherent adjuvant properties, they can be used as adjuvants in combination with subunit vaccines. The capacity of all species of ghosts (membranes, periplasm, and internal lumen) to carry foreign antigens seems to be surprisingly large and can be exploited to design new combination vaccines. By using derivatives of the λP r promoter and CI repressor it was possible to engineer regulatory circuits that allowed expression of the lethal gene, i.e., ghost formation, at different temperatures (22) .
A regulated programmed lysis of recombinant attenuated Salmonella live vaccine for antigen delivery after colonization of host lymphoid tissues has been developed (11) . The system is composed of two parts. The first component is an engineered strain with deletion of the asdA gene, involved in diaminopimelic acid synthesis, and arabinose-regulated expression of murA gene, involved in muramic acid synthesis, two genes required for peptidoglycan synthesis, and additional mutations to enhance complete lysis and antigen delivery. The second component is a plasmid that encodes arabinose-regulated murA and asdA expression and C2 repressor-regulated synthesis of antisense asdA and murA mRNA transcribed from the P22 phage P R promoter. An arabinose-regulated c2 gene is present in the chromosome. The recombinant strain exhibits arabinose-dependent growth. Upon invasion of host tissues (i.e., an arabinose-free environment) transcription of asdA, murA, and c2 ceases, and the drop in C2 results in activation of P R , driving synthesis of antisense mRNA to block translation of any residual asdA and murA mRNA. This passive containment system has potential applications with other bacteria in which biological containment would be desirable (11) . Passive containment strategies for lactic acid bacteria used as vaccine vectors have also been reported (12, 14) . An active containment system that responds to iron limitation was expressed in an E. coli-based protein delivery system to develop a recombinant vector vaccine that was shown to lyse in response to iron-limiting signal in vivo, implementing antigen release and biological containment (46) .
Containment Strategies for Fermentation Processes
Active containment systems are also of great utility for biological processes carried out in contained environments (Table 3 ). Biotechnology companies have tools to satisfy the biosafety requirements of the products they want to commercialize. Furthermore, the use of genetic circuits that limit DNA transfer are of interest for process protection and process optimization reasons. For instance, phage infections threaten most fermentation bioprocesses. A phage protection strategy relies on designing mechanisms that will capture an emerging phage and prevent its proliferation to disruptive population levels. Sacrificing infected cells through phage-induced suicide strategies establishes an altruistic goal of protecting the bacterial population as a whole (34) . To this end, a suicide plasmid was constructed that harbors the phage-inducible promoter (Φ31P) from the lytic phage Φ31 of L. lactis, driving the expression of a lethal restriction cassette (LlaIR + ) for the simultaneous killing of the propagation host cell and the infecting phage. Infection assays revealed that only 15% of infected cells released the phage progeny. The Φ31P/LlaIR + suicide plasmid also inhibited four Φ31-derived recombinant phages at levels at least 10-fold greater than that of Φ31 (34). This type of phage-triggered suicide strategy can be applied to any bacterium-phage combination in fermentation environments, given a regulatory element that is triggered by the infecting phage and a lethal gene that causes effective killing of the propagation host (34) . On the other hand, the design of biocatalysts whose lysis is artificially triggered by a cheap inducer, e.g., benzoate and its derivatives, might facilitate downstream processing operations for industrial applications. Thus, in bioprocesses that involve lysis of the cells, the release of chromosomal DNA increases the sample viscosity and reduces the efficiency of the subsequent centrifugation, filtration, and other downstream processing steps. The use of suicide circuits based on nucleases may be of interest for the reduction of such cell lysate viscosity (67) .
A programmed self-disruptive P. putida strain was constructed to control and facilitate the release of polyhydroxyalkanoate granules to the extracellular medium. The autolytic cell disruption system was based on two simultaneous strategies: the coordinated action of two proteins from the pneumococcal bacteriophage EJ-1, an endolysin (Ejl) and a holin (Ejh), and the mutation of the tolB gene, which exhibits alterations in outer membrane integrity that induce lysis hypersensitivity. The ejl and ejh genes were expressed under an XylS/Pm monocopy expression system inserted into the chromosome of the tolB mutant strain in the presence of 3methylbenzoate as the inducer molecule (68) .
Containment Strategies for Fundamental Research
Conditional suicide systems are useful genetic tools in the laboratory for safe cloning and manipulation of genes encoding highly toxic proteins as well as for developing positive selection cloning vectors and various forms of gene replacement (69) ( Table 3) .
Suicide plasmids constitute interesting tools for fundamental research in microbial ecology (Table 3) . Genetic flux in microbial communities is a critical component of their metabolic potential and, therefore, it is important to acquire a fundamental understanding of the parameters that influence it in nature (70) . Suicide plasmids allow the release of biochemically unmanipulated DNA into a selected environment at a specific time point. The lytic cassette S/R/Rz from λ phage was placed under the control of the Ptac promoter in different Gramnegative bacteria, and the resulting plasmid caused, after addition of the inducer, controlled cell death and release of large amounts of nucleic acids that persisted into the surrounding medium for several days. This system has been used to study natural transformation in bacteria and the environmental fate of DNA released by cell death (16) .
To study horizontal gene transfer in environmental samples from an introduced donor bacterium to a complex microbial community, selection of the recipient cells harboring the gene of interest requires counterselection of the donor cells. For this purpose, the introduction of an inducible suicide system in such donor cells would be very useful (15, 71) . A P. putida strain with two chromosomal copies of the gef gene was used as the donor of the conjugative RP4 plasmid. Although the donor strain was successfully eliminated in filter-matings, elimination of the donor in microcosms by induction of the suicide genes did not succeed (72) , and therefore this strategy requires further development.
Gene transfer plays an important role in adaptive responses of microbial communities to environmental changes, in genetic stability, and in species identity. For instance, the ability of some bacteria to degrade toxic pollutants is usually plasmid encoded. Even if the introduced strains are unable to compete with the preadapted microbiota and disappear, transfer of the degradative plasmids to the indigenous population of microorganisms contributes significantly to the improved rate of in situ degradation (70) . To assess the importance of plasmid transfer in adaptation of microbial communities to different stress conditions, it would be very helpful to use contained plasmids that possess the appropriate traits to adapt to such conditions but that cannot spread from an introduced donor organism to the indigenous microbiota. Lethal donation circuits, such as those described above for gene containment, constitute interesting tools to explore the ecological and evolutionary consequences of shifting the natural equilibrium between genetic change and genetic constancy toward the latter (35, 38) .
To conclude this section it is worth mentioning that since 1995 several patents have been granted for the use of the containment systems discussed above (US 5,670,370; US 5,672,345; US 5,679,533; US 5,681,745; US 5,702,916; US 6,287,844; US 7,183,097; US 7,780,961; US 2003/026883; US 2005/0276788; US 2013/0023035).
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Active containment systems are a major tool to reduce the uncertainty associated with the introduction of monocultures, genetically engineered or not, into target habitats. While biological containment reduces the survival of the introduced organism outside the target habitat and/or upon completion of the projected task, gene containment strategies reduce the lateral spread of the key genetic determinants to indigenous microorganisms. Whereas trials of such contained microorganisms have been carried out in experimental microcosms, validation of the containment systems in real field releases constitutes the next step.
Many lethal functions and regulatory circuits have been used and combined to design efficient containment systems. As many new genomes are being sequenced, novel lethal genes and regulatory elements are available, e.g., new toxin-antitoxin modules, and they could be used to increase further the current containment efficiencies and to expand containment to other organisms. In this sense, since most of the existing suicide systems have been designed for aerobic proteobacteria, it becomes necessary to develop similar systems for other microorganisms, e.g., Gram-positive bacteria, anaerobes, etc., that also play an important role in the environment and are the subject of genetic manipulations for biotechnological purposes. Recently, synthetic gene circuits have been constructed to develop counters that can be used in different settings for a variety of purposes across a range of timescales. For example, if inputs to the synthetic counter were coupled to the cell cycle, one might program cell death to occur after a user-defined number of cell divisions to limit the life as a safety mechanism in engineered strains (73) . Engineering cell death controlled by bacterial quorum-sensing systems that respond to cell density, and that do not require the addition of external inducers, would be another strategy for containment of GMOs intended for large-scale use in the environment.
In fundamental research, suicide circuits become relevant tools to address the role of gene transfer, mainly plasmid transfer, in evolution and how this transfer contributes to genome plasticity and to the rapid adaptation of microbial communities to environmental changes. Nevertheless, the use of containment strategies to address key questions in molecular microbial ecology requires further development.
We should be aware that although the current containment systems can increase the predictability of GMOs in the environment, containment will never be absolute, due to the existence of mutations that lead to the appearance of surviving subpopulations. In this sense, orthogonal systems appear to be the solution for setting a functional genetic firewall that will allow absolute containment of recombinant organisms. However, we are still a long way from having such orthogonal systems. First, we have to engineer cells in which DNA has been replaced by XNAs and the appropriate replication machinery. Then, XNAs should be combined with cognate RNA polymerases that generate transcripts with expanded or alternative genetic codes that incorporate nonnatural amino acids to proteins. From the point of view of containment, fully orthogonal organisms will only survive with a constant supply of orthogonal building blocks from a controlled environment. Nevertheless, the efficiency of such synthetic organisms for a particular biotechnological process is still unknown. Moreover, recent findings suggest that XNAs might interfere with replication and gene expression of natural DNA and RNA, thus creating the possibility that escaped orthogonal organisms might impact natural ecosystems (10) .
